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1.  Introduction 
 
It would be a mistake to take the Vedic Upani∑ads as point of departure for the 
development of systematic philosophy in India. These Upani∑ads contain no systematic 
philosophy, nor are they taken as basis for the elaboration of systematic philosophy during 
the period that interests us. No sources of systematized so-called Vedånta philosophy — 
which should perhaps be called “Vedåntism” or “Vedåntic” or even “Vedåntistic” 
philosophy — have come down to us from this period, and it is the one school of thought 
that is absent in the debates of that time. Probably the first more or less datable reference to 
systematic Vedånta philosophy occurs in the work of the Buddhist scholar Bhavya, who 
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belongs to the sixth century C.E. Systematic philosophy did exist before this date in India, 
and its practitioners were interested in each others' opinions, but systematized Vedånta 
philosophy was either non-existent, or ignored by all. (Qvarnström 1989: 15) 
 The other two so-called orthodox ontologies, viz., Såµkhya and Vaiße∑ika, did exist 
during the period preceding the Gupta empire, but the number of surviving texts is very 
small indeed. This small number stands in sharp contrast with the number of Buddhist 
philosophical texts that are still accessible to us. Two volumes of the Encyclopedia of 
Indian Philosophies, no. VII and VIII, describe Buddhist texts composed before 350 C.E. 
(Potter 1996; 1999) No Såµkhya text from that period survives, and for Vaiße∑ika we only 
have the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, which is known to have undergone changes and interpolations. 
 These contrasting numbers should not induce us to draw hasty conclusions. An 
important number of Buddhist texts have survived because they had the good luck of being 
translated into Chinese at an early date. Few Brahmanical texts had this good fortune. It is 
also clear that Såµkhya and Vaiße∑ika were in existence at least during the last centuries 
preceding the Gupta empire, and that texts belonging to these schools existed but have not 
survived. It seems yet undeniable that during the early centuries of the Common Era and 
before systematic philosophy had far more Buddhist than Brahmanical practitioners. 
 For the early history of Buddhist systematic philosophy we have access to a large 
number of surviving texts. In the case of the Brahmanical schools we depend on what might 
be called textual archeology. In order to reestablish at least some degree of equilibrium 
between the two currents, it may be useful here to summarize some of its findings with 
regard to Brahmanical philosophy. 
 The systematic exploration of quotations of Såµkhya material in texts belonging to 
other traditions of thought allowed Erich Frauwallner (1958) to reconstitute passages 
presumably belonging to the ›a∑†itantra of Vår∑agaˆya, a lost Såµkhya work that may have 
belonged to around 300 C.E. The passages reconstituted by Frauwallner deal with 
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epistemology. To recover these Frauwallner based himself primarily on the 
Pramåˆasamuccaya of the Buddhist Dignåga along with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, and 
on the Dvådaßåranayacakra of the Jaina Mallavådin along with SiµhasËri's commentary 
Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥. Frauwallner argued that some of the material contained in these texts 
had been quoted from Vår∑agaˆya's composition, some of it from commentaries thereon. 
Frauwallner's exploration of Jinendrabuddhi's Pramåˆasamuccaya†¥kå for fragments from 
the ›a∑†itantra has been continued by Ernst Steinkellner (1999). 
 Other quoted passages in the works of non-Såµkhya authors bring to light further 
features of the system of thought that appears to have been presented in Vår∑agaˆya's 
›a∑†itantra. Various early authors — most notable among them Bhart®hari, Dharmapåla and 
Mallavådin — attribute to Såµkhya a position which differs from the one which finds 
expression in the surviving Såµkhya works. According to them, Såµkhya looked upon 
substances as being collections of qualities. Nothing in the surviving Såµkhya literature 
supports this point of view, but the early testimonies are clear in this regard. What is more, 
there are indications that the qualities once figured among the twenty-five tattvas of 
Såµkhya, contrary to the list preserved in the surviving texts, which does not mention 
them. There are also indications that the five tanmåtras, which in classical Såµkhya would 
seem to make up for the five qualities of pre-classical Såµkhya, may have undergone a 
major change in the way they were conceptualized, from atomic to omnipresent. The nature 
of material nature (pradhåna), finally, turns out to be quite different in the ›a∑†itantra from 
what it became in the classical system. If we are correct in attributing these various pre-
classical positions to Vår∑agaˆya's ›a∑†itantra, it will be clear that systematic Såµkhya 
went through important changes during the last century or so of the period that interests us.1 
 The frequent occurrence in various early texts, prominent among them the 
Mahåbhårata, of the term Såµkhya and of ideas that are similar to those of systematic 
Såµkhya, has not so far allowed a plausible reconstruction of the earliest history of 
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systematic Såµkhya, before the time of Vår∑agaˆya. One of the difficulties is that we do 
not know in what relation those passages stand to Såµkhya as a systematic philosophy. Are 
they early echoes of a system of philosophy that had been created and that found its direct 
expression in texts that are now lost to us? Or do these passages provide glimpses of the 
non-systematized predecessors of Såµkhya philosophy? The fact that Såµkhya-like ideas 
still appear in much more recent religious texts suggests that non-philosophical Såµkhya 
largely led a life of its own, little influenced by the attempts of systematic thinkers to create 
a coherent whole out of these floating elements. It also suggests that non-philosophical 
Såµkhya existed before, as well as beside, philosophical Såµkhya. Regarding the latter it is 
difficult to look back further than Vår∑agaˆya, even though it is clear that some form of 
philosophical Såµkhya existed already at the time of Óryadeva and therefore most 
probably before Vår∑agaˆya. (Cp. Bakker & Bisschop 1999; Brockington 1999) 
 
The situation of Vaiße∑ika is similar to the one of Såµkhya in that we have a short 
exposition of the classical system in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßasta, and various 
fragments from a more detailed earlier work which appears to have been for some time the 
main text of this school of thought. This lost earlier text is the Ka†and¥, whose author may 
have been a certain Råvaˆa. The Ka†and¥ was a commentary on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, and 
was itself commented upon in a È¥kå by the same Praßasta who also composed the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha. This commentary by Praßasta, too, is now lost, but fragments of 
this text, too, have been preserved. Information about the Ka†and¥ and Praßasta's È¥kå can 
be derived from critical discussions in the works of Mallavådin and SiµhasËri, as well as 
from the works of the Vedåntin Ía∫kara. The Ka†and¥ appears to have been more recent 
than the ›a∑†itantra: though older than Dignåga, its treatment of fallacious reasons indicates 
that it is more recent than Vasubandhu the author of the Vådavidhi and Vådavidhåna. 
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 The Vaiße∑ika of the Ka†and¥ was not in all respects identical with that of the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha and its commentaries. A particularly important difference is the 
acceptance of a creator god in the latter where the former had no place for one. A relatively 
minor, yet theoretically important, difference concerns the question how many atoms there 
are in a speck of dust: six in classical Vaiße∑ika, three in the Ka†and¥. (Bronkhorst 1993; 
2004) 
 In order to find out more about Vaiße∑ika from the period before the Ka†and¥, our 
most important source of information is, of course, the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. Unfortunately this 
text has reached us in a number of differing versions. What is worse, we know that this text 
had already undergone changes at an early age. The full extent of those changes can no 
longer be determined, but the evidence of some early authors — among them Bhart®hari, 
Dignåga, Jinabhadra, and Praßasta himself — permits us to conclude that certain portions 
have been added to the original text. We know, for example, that the original Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra did not look upon sound as a quality, but rather as a substance, a form of wind. 
(Bronkhorst 1993a; 1994a) 
 Since there are serious doubts about the form of the original Vaiße∑ika SËtra, it is 
difficult to determine its date. Quite independently of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, however, there is 
evidence to show that Vaiße∑ika did exist during the early centuries of the common era. A 
Vaiße∑ika position is criticized in the Spitzer manuscript, which presumably dates from the 
third century at the latest (Franco 2000; 2000a; 2000b; 2001). The voluminous 
Sarvåstivådin Mahåvibhå∑å shows acquaintance with Vaiße∑ika (and with Såµkhya), as 
does perhaps Aßvagho∑a, the author of the Buddhacarita. All this shows that Vaiße∑ika and 
Såµkhya existed in some form from at least the first centuries of the common era onward. 
There is on the other hand no evidence known to me that would allow us to conclude that 
these schools existed already before that period. The earlier Buddhist texts do not mention 
them, and not even Patañjali's voluminous Vyåkaraˆa-Mahåbhå∑ya contains any trace of 
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awareness of them; being a Brahminical text, it might have been expected to do so. 
(Bronkhorst 2005) 
 
As stated above, a number of Buddhist philosophical texts have been preserved, and we do 
not therefore depend on textual archeology to find out what Buddhist thinkers thought. 
There is, on the other hand, a fair amount of uncertainty regarding the exact dates of many 
of those texts. We know that systematic thinking started early, first of all it seems in 
Sarvåstivåda Buddhism. We have Chinese translations of systematizing texts that date from 
the first centuries C.E. A manuscript dating from the first century has been found which, as 
Collett Cox informs me, contains a polemical Abhidharma text which criticizes the 
Sarvåstivådins.2 All this shows that systematic philosophizing among the Sarvåstivådins 
began early, probably well before the beginning of the common era. Further reflections 
about the period at which it began will be found below. 
 
Jainism came to contribute to the philosophical debate at a rather late stage. This religious 
movement — or rather one major branch of it: the Ívetåmbaras — has left us what it 
considers the original canon of Jainism. The authenticity of this canon is not accepted by 
other Jainas. Even the Ívetåmbaras agree that part of their canon got irrevocably lost, and 
that what survived did not reach its final form until the fifth century of the common era; 
there are clear indications that at least some of its texts are not very old. What is more, there 
is nothing that one might call systematic philosophy in the canon. The first attempt to 
systematize traditional doctrine finds its expression in the Tattvårtha SËtra, a text which 
may belong to the third or fourth century C.E. (Dundas 1992: 61 f., 74; 2002: 70 f., 86; 
Bronkhorst 1985) 
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2. The early history of Indian philosophy in outline.  
 
In spite of the limited source material at our disposal, a number of indications suggest that 
the period from the beginning of Indian systematic philosophy up to the time of the Gupta 
empire can be divided into two distinct eras. During these two eras those who were 
intellectually active had altogether different preoccupations, and were driven by different 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of the world. This is true to the extent that it may 
be useful to borrow a concept from the French thinker Michel Foucault. In his book The 
Order of Things he introduces the concept of episteme. An episteme, as Foucault uses the 
term, is the structure of thought that defines an era. In the recent history of Europe, for 
example, the Renaissance could be defined by its assumption of the resemblance between 
words and things. Following periods — the classical age or Enlightenment, then the modern 
age — are characterized differently: sciences in the classical age were dominated by 
systems of classification; the modern age is characterized by humanist philosophy and the 
invention of the human sciences. Foucault is of the opinion that two principles govern these 
epistemes. The first of these states that each era can have only one episteme. As he puts it: 
“In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that 
defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge”. According to the second principle, 
each episteme is discontinuous with the next. As a result, in different eras “things are no 
longer perceived, described, expressed, characterized, classified, and known in the same 
way”. (Foucault 1973: 168, 217; Windschuttle 2000: 137 f.) 
 It is not necessary to side with Foucault in holding that eras are thus unambiguously 
defined each by their own episteme. Nor is one required to accept that “in any given culture 
and at any given moment there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of 
possibility of all knowledge”. Also Foucault's claim that different eras have to be radically 
different from each other may legitimately be questioned. In spite of whatever objections 
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one may have to some or all of Foucault's claims, it may yet be useful to be open to the 
possibility that intellectual life in different periods may be characterized or to some extent 
even determined by different preoccupations and presuppositions. This may not be quite 
what Foucault meant when he introduced the notion of episteme, yet has the undeniable 
advantage of drawing attention to what connects different manifestations of thought that 
occur during one and the same period of time in a specific culture, and to what 
distinguishes them from preceding and succeeding periods. One might, of course, prefer to 
use some such term as Zeitgeist instead, but this term is too little precise for our present 
purposes. It will become clear that an adjusted notion of episteme, which remains more 
specific than Zeitgeist, will be helpful in making sense of the early centuries of Indian 
systematic philosophy. 
 
For the period that interests us at present, two “epistemes” can be distinguished, two 
fundamental approaches to reality. These two “epistemes” succeed each other in time. This 
does not mean that at no point of time the two coexist. There is, as will become clear, 
considerable overlap. This overlap does not however remove the impression that the first of 
these “epistemes” really belongs to the earlier era, and continues into the second one, if not 
as a fossil, then at any rate as a survival from the past. 
 The first of the two “epistemes” to be considered is characterized by the belief that 
reality is thoroughly atomistic. Not only does the material world consist of identifiable 
ultimate constituents; also processes, which by their nature extend over stretches of time, 
can be analyzed into successions of momentary occurrences. Whatever happens in the 
world can be reduced to the interaction of those ultimate constituents. In the case of 
processes, this interaction is strictly unidirectional: earlier momentary occurrences 
determine the immediately following ones. 
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 The second “episteme”, which succeeds the first one and in some cases supplants it 
altogether, has as principal characteristic the conviction of a close and inseparable 
connection between language and reality. A belief of this kind, though in a weaker form, 
had already accompanied some of the philosophical developments of the preceding era. In 
the new era this belief, now extended in an fundamental manner, did not only become the 
shared conviction of all thinkers; it became a shared concern, which inspired philosophers 
to develop most of the fundamental doctrines that were to accompany and even define the 
different schools of thought for centuries to come. 
 Since time and place do not permit to argue each of the following points in detail, I 
will limit myself to a short presentation based on research published elsewhere. 
 
2.1.  The first “episteme” 
 
Sarvåstivåda 
The Sarvåstivådins may have been the first systematic philosophers in India. It seems likely 
that these Buddhists created, in a short time span, a coherent system of thought out of 
traditional material. This traditional material consisted primarily of lists of so-called 
dharmas. For present purposes it will not be necessary to provide a detailed description of 
these dharmas. The lists of dharmas were revised, new dharmas were introduced, and an 
altogether different categorization was imposed upon them (the so-called Pañcavastuka). 
All these changes did have consequences that had more than mere scholastic interest. Or 
rather: these changes were the scholastic expression of a changed and systematized way of 
understanding the world, of an ontology that had not so far been part of the Buddhist 
tradition. 
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 The ontology which Sarvåstivåda imposed upon its Buddhist heritage is thoroughly 
atomistic in its nature. It denies the existence of composite things. Existence, it is 
maintained, only belongs to their ultimate parts. These ultimate parts are the dharmas. 
 These dharmas are not to be identified with material atoms. Most of the dharmas 
which the Sarvåstivådins inherited from the preceding Buddhist tradition concern mental 
states, and even those few that do concern the material world are not themselves material 
atoms. This does not mean that the existence of material atoms is rejected. Their existence 
is accepted, but they are conceived of as conglomerations of certain dharmas, among them 
the qualities form, odor, taste and touch. Material atoms in Sarvåstivåda are not therefore 
the ultimate constituents of matter. 
 The same atomistic attitude which postulates that only the dharmas really exist is 
applied to things extended in time: all that exists is momentary, so that strictly speaking 
only momentary dharmas exist. 
 The world, seen in this way, consists of series of momentary dharmas that succeed 
each other. This succession is clearly not haphazard: the world is a relatively stable and to 
some extent predictable place. This is due to the fact that a causal mechanism is responsible 
for the orderly continuation of things. This causal mechanism, which receives due attention 
in the Sarvåstivåda texts, sees to it that each succeeding moment is determined by the 
immediately preceding one. 
 This model of the world, in which all things and processes are presented as “trains” 
of momentary entities, and in which the earlier entities are proximate causes that “push” the 
later ones forward, applies also, and especially so, to mental processes. Recall that most 
dharmas are mental by nature. Indeed, the canonical source inspiring much of the thought 
about causality — the doctrine of prat¥tyasamutpåda “origination in dependence”, see 
below — primarily concerns the causal interrelationship between mental factors. 
SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE EMPIRES 11 
 
 
 In explaining mental processes the Sarvåstivådins were confronted with difficulties 
which had to be dealt with. They were of the opinion that two mental events cannot 
simultaneously occur in one person. This leads to difficulties in the case of some such 
mental event as the observation of one's own desire. This involves two mental events: the 
desire and the observation of which it is the object. The desire, being the cause of its own 
observation, has to precede the observation. Since mental events are momentary, and the 
desire is therefore no longer present when it is observed, this would imply that one observes 
a non-present event. Confronted with this dilemma, the Sarvåstivådins concluded that 
something non-present exists. Future and past things all exist: sarvam asti. This peculiar 
belief gave the Sarvåstivådins their name. 
 The vision which the Sarvåstivådin systematizers imposed upon the world is very 
different from the common sense perception of the world. These Buddhist thinkers were 
confronted with the task of explaining how it is that such a thoroughly atomistic world 
appears to us as if it consists of objects that are extended both in space and in time. They 
provided an answer by bringing in the words of language. Composite objects — such as 
chariots, houses, and indeed persons — do not really exist, but are believed to exist because 
there is a word for them. These things derive their pseudo-existence from the words of 
language. This implies of course that the world of our experience (which does not really 
exist) has a close and intrinsic connection with the words of language. (Bronkhorst 2000: 
76-127, esp. 94 ff.) 
 
Other Buddhist schools 
The interpretation of reality first elaborated by the Sarvåstivådins spread to other Buddhist 
schools in continental India, not without being adapted and modified in the process. Soon 
all continental Indian Buddhists shared notions such as the momentariness of all that exists, 
and the fundamental non-existence of composite objects. Even the schools that adhered to 
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the so-called pudgala-våda tried to define the pudgala — whose existence they supposedly 
accepted — in terms that owed much to the scholastic efforts of the Sarvåstivådins and 
related schools. That is to say, the fundamentally atomistic understanding of reality became 
common property of all those continental schools that have left us traces of their intellectual 
labor. 
 
Vaiße∑ika 
The same basic understanding of reality also spread further, beyond Buddhism. We have 
seen that very little documentary evidence regarding the earliest form of Vaiße∑ika has 
survived, but the texts that have survived allow us to conclude that Vaiße∑ika, probably 
from its beginning, is pervaded by the same atomistic vision of the world which we 
associate with Sarvåstivåda and other Buddhist schools of that period. In the case of 
Vaiße∑ika this is all the more striking since it obviously made an point of rejecting 
Sarvåstivåda and of replacing their positions with different ones of their own. Vaiße∑ika did 
not accept that only ultimate constituents exist; this does not change the fact that it 
postulated the existence of ultimate constituents, atoms, which it then granted existence 
beside composite objects. Vaiße∑ika was not willing to deny the existence of things 
extending in time either; yet its analysis of mental and related processes (which includes 
their ideas about number) reveals a succession of momentary steps; indeed, it has been said 
to be expressive of an “atomistic mode of thinking”. Even the acceptance of common sense 
reality, which distinguished Vaiße∑ika from Sarvåstivåda, led to a position which is very 
close to the one rejected. The common sense world of our experience is unreal and 
intimately connected with the words of language according to Sarvåstivåda. This same 
common sense world is real according to Vaiße∑ika, but still intimately connected with the 
words of language. 
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 In order to create a coherent vision out of the elements just mentioned, Vaiße∑ika 
had to introduce a number of notions which in themselves were very different from what 
we find in contemporary Buddhist philosophy. This easily obscures the fact that both 
worked on the basis of an atomistic understanding of the world (both spatially and 
temporally) in which only proximate causality was allowed to “push” the next moments 
forward. (Lysenko 1994; Bronkhorst 1992) 
 
Jainism 
The SËyaga∂a (Skt. SËtrak®tå∫ga), one of the oldest texts of the Jaina canon, is acquainted 
with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. More interesting for our present purposes is 
that younger texts of the Jaina canon themselves adopt atomistic notions: the moment 
(samaya), the smallest unit of space (pradeßa), the atom (paramåˆu). All these are stated to 
be single, indivisible, indestructible in the Èhåˆa (Skt. Sthånå∫ga). The Viyåhapannati 
(Bhagavat¥) adds that “the atom and the objects that occupy one unit of space last one unit 
of time”. Other canonical passages show that the Jainas side with the Vaiße∑ikas in 
accepting composite objects as separate and individual things. (Jaini 1979: 98 ff.; 
Bronkhorst 2000b) 
 
Grammar 
The new atomistic way of thinking exerted an influence not just outside Buddhism, but 
outside religio-philosophical thought as well. There is reason to think that it exerted an 
influence on the discipline of grammar. This would then account for the conceptual gap 
which is known to exist between Påˆini and his commentator Patañjali. 
 The commentator Patañjali imposes a form of linearity on grammatical derivations 
which is not taught in Påˆini's grammer. S. D. Joshi and Paul Kiparsky have recently shown 
that many Påˆinian derivations make use of (and have to make use of) “lookahead”. 
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Patañjali tries to arrive at the correct result without it. Only one example will here be given 
to illustrate the difference. In the derivation of dadhati “they put” the third person plural 
ending is not anti, as usual, but ati. In Påˆinian terminology this means that the suffix jhi in 
the initial situation dhå-jhi is not replaced by anti, but by ati. However, the general rule (P. 
7.1.3: jho 'nta˙) prescribes substitution by anti, while the special rule (P. 7.1.4: ad 
abhyaståt) prescribes ati only for the special case of reduplication. But at the initial stage 
there is no reduplication as yet; this does not come about until after some intermediate 
steps. Lookahead takes this future development into account, and does not replace jhi by 
anti until reduplication has taken place. Patañjali, and following him all later commentators, 
did not like lookahead, and tried to avoid it wherever possible. He goes through much 
trouble to formulate special principles and ad hoc rules that are meant to secure that each 
step in a derivation be determined by the elements in place, not by elements that have not 
yet appeared. 
 Derivations as envisaged by Patañjali cannot use preceding information either. Only 
the elements in place at a particular stage determine the next operation. 
  This linear scheme characterizes processes in the first “episteme”: they consist of 
distinct stages, each of which is wholly determined by the immediately preceding one. It 
seems reasonable to assume that Patañjali thought of a grammatical derivation as some kind 
of process. Whether he thought of it as a mental process is less clear. For our present 
purposes this does not matter. Patañjali treated derivations as processes, and expected them 
to behave the way their “episteme” told them processes should behave. 
 It is of some importance to note that Kåtyåyana, whose vårttikas are incorporated 
into Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya, does not yet adhere to Patañjali's vision of a grammatical 
derivation in which each stage is completely and exclusively determined by the elements in 
place. (Bronkhorst 2004a.) 
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Såµkhya 
Såµkhya systematic thought looks at first sight like the odd man out in this enumeration of 
intellectual currents affected by the atomistic “episteme”. At first sight it seems indeed that 
the systematizers of this philosophy were not affected by it. Philosophical Såµkhya as 
known to us from its classical texts does not postulate the existence of atoms, nor does it 
divide processes into momentary units. Såµkhya causal thinking is poles apart from the 
idea of momentary proximate causes that push processes forward.  
 There is yet evidence concerning early systematic Såµkhya that suggests that the 
situation was not quite like that during the centuries preceding the Såµkhya Kårikå, the 
earliest surviving text. A variety of early testimonies indicate that the Såµkhya that found 
expression in Vår∑agaˆya's ›a∑†itantra and before included the view that the five qualities 
sound, touch, color, taste and odor were the ultimate constituents of all material objects. 
This point of view is of course similar to that of the Sarvåstivådins, who in addition thought 
that these qualities were essential ingredients of material atoms. (Bronkhorst 1994) 
 A number of indications furthermore suggest that early systematic Såµkhya did 
have the idea of atoms that were constituted of more elementary parts. These more 
elementary parts are often called tanmåtras, and contain among themselves (or are simply 
identified with) the five qualities.3 
 As has been pointed out above, the Såµkhya that we find in the surviving texts is 
not in all details identical with the earlier form which interests us most at present, but 
information about which can only be obtained through more or less direct references and 
quotations in other works. We will see below that the second “episteme” may be 
responsible for the modifications subsequently introduced into school doctrine. 
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Other sciences 
The scarcity of surviving textual material from the centuries around the beginning of the 
common era does not allow us to fathom the extent to which the atomistic vision of the 
world affected other sciences of that time. One might think that sciences such as medicine 
would be unlikely to be influenced by it. It is therefore all the more noteworthy that the 
Caraka Saµhitå mentions atoms (paramåˆu; Íår¥rasthåna 7.17),4 and accepts 
momentariness in the following words, which it puts in the mouth of Ótreya Punarvasu 
(SËtrasthåna 16.33): “Because it passes so rapidly, a thing perishes the moment is has come 
into being. There is no cause of its disappearance, nor does it undergo modification.” It 
would be imprudent to conclude more from this last passage than that the idea of 
momentariness was widespread enough to find expression in this isolated passage of the 
Caraka Saµhitå. (Meulenbeld 1999: IA: 110 f.; Bronkhorst 2002b) Isolated remarks in 
other texts, such as the Manusm®ti's observation (1.27) that the world comes about with 
(sårdham) the impermanent atomic particles of the five elements (aˆvyo måtrå vinåßinyo 
daßårdhånåm), have to be treated with equal caution. Commentators (Medhåtithi, KullËka, 
etc.), be it noted, interpret these impermanent atomic particles as being the Såµkhya 
tanmåtras. 
 
Conclusions 
This short presentation of the way in which the first “episteme” finds expression in Indian 
intellectual life during the centuries around the beginning of the common era allows us to 
draw some tentative conclusions about chronological and related issues. It seems hard to 
deny that this particular way of visualizing the world started within a school of Buddhism. 
Several traditional Buddhist elements easily lent themselves to a new interpretation that is 
in conformity with the newly propounded vision of the world. The problematic anåtman 
doctrine of traditional Buddhism lent itself to an interpretation in which no composite 
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person is believed to exist beside its components, the dharmas. Statements about the 
impermanence of things could be taken as a confirmation of the momentariness of all that 
is. The incomprehensible doctrine of “origination in dependence” (prat¥tyasamutpåda) 
could be interpreted as a causal theory in which earlier dharmas determine succeeding ones 
(“that being, this comes to be; from the arising of that, this arises; that being absent, this is 
not; from the cessation of that, this ceases”). These aspects of traditional Buddhism could 
be interpreted so as to fit the new ontology, and they were. 
 There are strong reasons to believe that this vision was first launched in the 
Sarvåstivåda school of Buddhism in particular. The complete revision of Abhidharma 
undertaken by the Sarvåstivådins has already left clear traces in their Abhidharma Pi†aka, 
which is in these respects totally different from the other surviving Abhidharma Pi†aka, that 
of the Theravådins. Early non-canonical texts of the same school provide us with further 
information. It seems probable that all the new ideas that we associate with the new 
“episteme” were introduced more or less simultaneously with the new categorization 
known by the name Pañcavastuka. The fact that the Sarvåstivåda revision of Abhidharma 
has determined the content of at least a number of canonical Abhidharma texts suggests that 
it must have taken place at a rather early date. The Sarvåstivåda texts themselves do not 
however allow us to make a precise estimate. 
 It is here that the interpretation of Påˆini's grammar by Patañjali may be of help. We 
have seen that this commentator imposes upon the grammar processes of the kind 
characteristic of the first “episteme”. This suggests that he had been infected by ideas that 
started with the Sarvåstivådins; he may therefore post-date the Pañcavastuka. This would 
agree with the fact that there are various other indications supporting the view that Patañjali 
was acquainted with Buddhist literature, and with Sarvåstivåda ideas in particular. 
(Bronkhorst 1987; 1995; 2002c) This would then justify the conclusion that the conceptual 
revolution that took place in Sarvåstivåda must be dated before Patañjali the author of the 
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Mahåbhå∑ya. Patañjali is supposed to have lived around or soon after 150 B.C.E., in the 
North-West of the subcontinent.5 The Sarvåstivådins are commonly accepted to have 
belonged to that region. Their intellectual revolution may therefore have taken place before 
150 B.C.E. 
 The fact that already parts of the Ívetåmbara Jaina canon have yielded to the 
atomistic vision of the world does not permit to draw chronological conclusions of much 
importance. The chronology of this mass of texts is notoriously uncertain; the only reliable 
information seems to be that the texts reached their present forms in the fifth century of the 
common era. This does not imply that all parts of the canon are equally young, but the fact 
that the SËyaga∂a (= SËtrak®tå∫ga), which is normally considered one of its oldest parts, 
already associates Buddhists with momentariness, suggests a relatively late date for the 
Jaina canonical texts that have adopted momentariness and general atomism themselves. (It 
may of course also be taken to argue for an early date for the Pañcavastuka.) 
 
2.2.  The second “episteme”6 
At four different places of the Mahåbhå∑ya we find the following passage:7 
Someone says to some weaver: “weave a cloth out of this thread”. He (i.e., the 
weaver) thinks: if it is (already) a cloth, it is not (still) to be woven. But if it is (still) 
to be woven, it is not a cloth. (To say,) it is (still) to be woven and it is a cloth 
becomes contradictory. Certainly, what he means is a designation (viz., “cloth”) yet 
to come (bhåvin¥ saµjñå). That, I think, is to be woven, which, when woven, 
becomes the (thing called) cloth. 
Patañjali draws from it a simple conclusion about the use of words: a word can be used to 
designate something that is not yet there. Most, if not all, thinkers belonging to the era 
characterized by the second “episteme” draw very different conclusions from very similar 
statements: conclusions, not about the use of words, but about the nature of the world. The 
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reason is that those later thinkers all shared a presupposition which clearly was not yet part 
of Patañjali's intellectual baggage.8 
 The shared presupposition which came to steer the subsequent development of 
Indian philosophy is the correspondence principle. Those who, explicitly or implicitly, 
accept the correspondence principle, accept that there is a close relationship between 
statements and the situations described by those statements, or more precisely: between the 
words of the statement and the things that make up the situation described. A possible 
example is the statement "John reads a book"; it describes a situation where there is John, a 
book, and the activity of reading. A similar analysis is possible in the case of numerous 
other statements. 
 Severe problems arise in the case of statements that describe the production of 
something, or its coming into being. The statement “the weaver weaves a cloth” can 
illustrate this. It describes a situation in which there is a weaver, the activity of weaving, but 
no cloth. Patañjali the grammarian (and his weaver) had already realized this, but had not 
been particularly puzzled by it because they did not yet accept, implicitly or explicitly, the 
correspondence principle. They had not yet fallen victim to the second “episteme”, which 
characterizes the next era. 
 It is difficult to understand how and why this major conceptual change had to take 
place, some time after Patañjali. For him and for no doubt most of his contemporaries a 
simple statement like “the weaver weaves a cloth” was not disturbing in any manner, and 
might at best tell us something about the way how in actual practice words are used. This 
same simple statement, on the other hand, confronted all thinkers of the succeeding era with 
profound ontological questions of the kind: where is the cloth? All of them were convinced 
that the word “cloth” had to refer to something present in the situation described. Since 
common sense sees no cloth here, many were ready to discard common sense and replace it 
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with a vision of reality in which there is something in the situation described corresponding 
to the word “cloth”. 
 
Någårjuna 
The first “episteme” appears to have entered Indian intellectual history through Buddhist 
thinkers; the same may be true of the second one. It is possible, though not certain, that 
Någårjuna was among the first to draw attention to the internal contradictions marring 
common sense statements of the kind “the weaver weaves a cloth” or “the cloth comes into 
being”. Indeed, contradictions do not just mar such common sense statements, they also 
mar many statements describing reality as conceived of by the Buddhist Abhidharma 
specialists, among them the Sarvåstivådins. The statement “the cloth comes into being” is 
problematic because there is no cloth in the situation described (if there were, it would not 
need to come into being); the same difficulty attaches to statements describing that a 
dharma comes into being. Någårjuna concludes that in reality nothing exists. This position 
is known by the name ßËnyavåda. 
 One verse from the MËlamadhyamakakårikå will here be cited because it clearly 
illustrates Någårjuna's procedure:9  
If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could be produced. Since that entity 
does not exist, what is produced? 
What, indeed, is produced? Någårjuna's answer is: nothing, for nothing really exists.10 
 
Såµkhya 
Denying that anything exists is not the only possible way of dealing with the problem. 
Another solution would be to maintain that, contrary to appearances, the cloth is present in 
the situation described by “the weaver weaves a cloth”. It could be held to be present in the 
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thread from which the cloth is being woven. This is the position that is known by the name 
satkåryavåda, and which systematic Såµkhya chose in order to deal with the problem.  
 In an attempt to make this counter-intuitive position plausible, Såµkhya henceforth 
emphasizes the continuity of the material cause that remains present before, during and 
after the production of a particular object: the thread precedes the cloth, clay precedes the 
pot, gold precedes the ornaments made of it. However, this emphasis on the continuously 
existing material cause is difficult to rhyme with the early notion that substances are mere 
collections of qualities. This may be the reason why this earlier notion was abandoned and 
is no longer present in the surviving texts of philosophical Såµkhya. In other words, under 
the influence of the second “episteme” Såµkhya abandoned the few links it had had with 
the first “episteme”. 
 
Sarvåstivåda 
The Sarvåstivåda Buddhists were better equipped than most to deal with the problems 
connected with the production of things. As a matter of fact, they already had a solution 
before the problem made its appearance. We have seen that this school of thought had 
introduced the notion that the past and future exist in order to solve the problem connected 
with the perception of one's own mental states. This same notion could now solve the new 
problem. Since the future cloth exists, each of the terms in the sentence “the weaver weaves 
a cloth” denotes an existing thing. (Strictly speaking all this must of course be translated 
into terms of the dharma theory, for dharmas are the only things that really exist.) The 
sarvåstivåda, though not created in order to solve the difficulties connected with the second 
“episteme”, provided a solution which in essence coincides with that provided by the 
satkåryavåda. 
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Ajåtivåda 
There is a third way to make sense of the statement “the weaver weaves a cloth”. Någårjuna 
had concluded that no cloth exists. The satkåryavådins maintained that no cloth can be 
produced because it is already there. The third solution would be to hold that no production 
can take place. This is the ajåtivåda. We find it most notably in Gau∂apåda's Ógamaßåstra, 
a text claimed by later Advaita Vedånta as its own, but also in the Mok∑opåya, which was 
to become the kernel of the later Yogavåsi∑†ha. (Bronkhorst 2001a) 
 
Vaiße∑ika 
The two schools of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika become, towards the end of our period, the most 
important representatives of a position known as asatkåryavåda, which is the opposite of 
satkåryavåda. However, textual archeology reveals that, before reaching this point, 
Vaiße∑ika underwent a development during which its position was close to the 
satkåryavåda. Exploiting the possibility offered by the system to the extent that something 
may be existent without possessing existence, Vaiße∑ika could maintain that something 
could exist while being produced. 
 
Jainism 
Jaina canonical and post-canonical sources show that the attraction of a variant of 
satkåryavåda was great here, too. However, Jainism gave this solution a special twist of its 
own. Jinabhadra's position, for example, finds expression in the following words: “a pot is 
being produced having been produced in the form of clay etc., because it is made of that. 
That same [pot] is being produced not having been produced concerning its particular 
shape, because that was not there before.” This way of speaking is, of course, typical of the 
so-called anekåntavåda that characterizes Jaina classical thought. What is more, the earliest 
canonical passages expressive of the anekåntavåda all occur in a context dealing with the 
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difficulty of production. In other words, anekåntavåda appears to be the way in which 
Jainism responded and gave expression to the second “episteme”. (Bronkhorst 2003) 
 
Asatkåryavåda 
All the thinkers considered so far were willing to draw drastic and often counter-intuitive 
conclusions from the perceived difficulties linked to statements describing the production 
of things. The Nyåya school of thought — soon to be followed by Vaiße∑ika — was not 
willing to do so. These thinkers rightly saw that the fundamental problem was related to the 
problem of referring. In “the weaver weaves a cloth”, the word “cloth” presumably had to 
refer to something that is present in the situation described. As long as we assume that the 
word “cloth” has to refer to the individual cloth that is being produced, there are 
difficulties. However, do words only refer to individual things? 
 The ontology accepted by Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika allowed of another solution. In this 
ontology there are not only individual things, but also universals. Beside countless 
individual cloths there is the universal that inheres in all of them. Individual cloths have a 
limited life span; the universal that inheres in all of them is eternal: it has no beginning and 
no end. That is to say, this universal is there at the time at which the cloth is produced. 
Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika therefore accepted that words do not only refer to their corresponding 
individuals, but to the related universals as well. This allowed them to solve the problem 
connected with the second “episteme” without straying too far from common sense. 
 
Apohavåda 
A word must here be said about a development that took place after the end of our period. It 
must be mentioned because it is, if not the logical consequence of what happened before, 
the solution found to a problem that had occupied Buddhist thinkers for a long time. 
Buddhist thinkers were in no position to follow the example of Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika. Their 
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ontology had no place for such things as universals. However, the 6th century thinker 
Dignåga — whom we know had been preoccupied with the problem of production — found 
an elegant solution, based on his analysis of the process of referring. He introduced the 
apohavåda, which implies that words do not directly denote, but exclude. The technical 
details of this solution cannot be dealt with here, but the consequence was clear: since 
referring is not based on a one to one relation between words and things, the 
correspondence principle cannot hold either. There does not have to be a cloth in the 
situation described by the statement “the weaver weaves a cloth”, because referring does 
not work like that. (Bronkhorst 1999b) 
 
Bhart®hari 
Bhart®hari follows Patañjali in matters grammatical. But where Patañjali saw no 
fundamental difficulties in statement like “the weaver weaves a cloth”, Bhart®hari did. He 
offers no fewer than four different solutions, some of which coincide with the ones already 
discussed. New is his suggestion that the objects referred to may have metaphorical, rather 
than real existence. Equally interesting is his proposal to attribute mental existence to those 
objects. 
 
2.3.  The persistence of the first “episteme” 
It will be clear from the preceding sections that the first and the second “episteme” do not 
behave like “real” epistemes as thought of by Foucault. The second “episteme” does not 
fully replace the first one in all cases: a number of thinkers held on to features of the first 
“episteme” even while looking for solutions for the problems posed by the second one. 
Most Buddhist Abhidharma schools as well as Brahmanical Vaiße∑ika fall into this 
category. These schools remain thoroughly atomistic in character and stick to the earlier 
understanding of causality. This last feature confronted them with major difficulties. 
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 Recall that in causality as conceived of in the first “episteme” each succeeding 
moment is determined by the immediately preceding one. This conception is not 
problematic in itself, but makes it difficult to visualize by what mechanism karmic 
retribution takes place. In order for karmic retribution to function, causal mechanisms must 
extend over long time spans: a present causal situation must determine right down to the 
last detail a future event that may be one or many lifetimes away. How is that possible 
without the interference of numerous other causal “trains”? Is such a long term causal 
mechanism really conceivable without outside supervision? 
 A school like Såµkhya was not much bothered by such questions. It seems likely 
that Såµkhya had never adopted the causal mechanism of the first “episteme” to begin 
with; its surviving texts shamelessly resort to teleological explanations. Buddhist 
Sarvåstivåda was not much concerned either: its specific doctrine to the extent that the past 
exists in the future allowed for the possibility of direct intervention at the right moment. 
But other Abhidharma schools and the Brahmanical school of Vaiße∑ika were deeply 
affected by this difficulty. Some of their thinkers took drastic steps to remove it. 
 According to tradition Vasubandhu the author of the Abhidharmakoßa and -bhå∑ya 
converted later in life to become a Yogåcåra vijñånavådin. He was not the first Buddhist 
idealist, but his reasons for adopting this position are clearly set out in his Viµßatikå, in the 
following words (commentary to verse 7): “The impression (våsanå) of a deed enters into 
the series (santåna) of consciousness, nowhere else. Why don't you accept that the fruition 
[comes about] right there where the impression is, and is [therefore] a corresponding 
modification of consciousness? What is the reason that you imagine the fruition of an 
impression [to come about] there, where the impression is not?” Vasubandhu considers all 
these three — a deed, the impression it leaves, and its future result — mental events. The 
causal connection between a deed and its karmic retribution much later — being different 
mental events in the one long concatenation of mental events that make up a person and her 
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reincarnations — looses in this way most of its mystery. Karmic retribution seen like this is 
no more difficult to explain than an agreeable or disagreeable dream. 
 Vaiße∑ika was, once again, not inclined to abandon the common sense view of 
reality. It did not therefore opt for idealism, and made a determined effort to discover the 
mechanism of karmic retribution. This effort did not succeed, and by the time of Praßasta 
the school turned to the one remaining option: it introduced the notion of a creator god, 
whose primary task it was to supervise karmic retribution. (Bronkhorst 2000a) 
 
2.4.  Summary and implications 
The preceding sections indicate how a number of at first sight unrelated positions that find 
expression in classical Indian philosophy — such as satkåryavåda, asatkåryavåda, 
ßËnyavåda, ajåtivåda, anekåntavåda, apohavåda, vijñånavåda, ¥ßvaravåda, to mention but 
these — are to be understood against the background of the two “epistemes” specified 
above. This in its turn implies that the history of Indian philosophy, even in its early phases, 
is more than the story of a number of unrelated schools of thought. Quite on the contrary, it 
consists of a web of interrelated developments, in which thinkers participated who, even 
though from different backgrounds and without much sympathy for each other, shared 
several presuppositions and questions. It is also clear that many of these thinkers were 
aware of each others' ideas, even across the boundaries of school, religion and, we may 
assume, geography.  
 All this raises questions. How did these early thinkers communicate with each 
other? and above all: why did they bother? The answer to these kinds of questions will not 
come from a mere analysis of doctrines. The very existence of shared “epistemes” takes us 
to the socio-political background of early Indian philosophy. 
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3. Socio-political factors 
 
Philosophical ideas do not grow on trees, nor do they find their origin in some Platonic 
heaven, isolated from the realities of life. This does not imply that the inner logic of 
philosophical developments can be ignored. It does however call for reflection on the 
circumstances which allow philosophies to develop in accordance with their “inner logic”. 
What do we know about these circumstances in early India? 
 The testimonies of Buddhist pilgrims from China as well as a multitude of legends 
preserved in India itself inform us that philosophical debates frequently took place, often at 
royal courts. Exponents of different positions would confront each other and try to show the 
superiority of their own views over those of their opponents. Winning such a debate could 
bring great advantages, and losing one could have catastrophic consequences not only for 
the debater but for his group as a whole. The outcome of debates was often decided by the 
king and his advisers, but this should not make us conclude that the art of debating played 
no role. The Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang tells us of a public discussion in which 
Dharmapåla, a Buddhist, had gained a great victory over non-Buddhists. Yet this discussion 
had been organized by a king who wished to destroy Buddhism in the country. This shows 
that other factors than political power could play a decisive role in these discussions. 
(Watters 1904-05: 372-73) 
 There is every reason to believe that debates of this kind were already a feature of 
the period that concerns us at present. One clear indication is that debating manuals were 
being composed during this period. One early surviving manual of this kind has been 
preserved as part of the Caraka Saµhitå, a treatise on medicine (åyurveda).11 Part of the 
Nyåya SËtra also counts as a debating manual. Någårjuna may have composed one. 
(Kajiyama 1991) Debating, as is clear from the numerous more recent testimonies referred 
to above, was not a leisure occupation for scholars in ivory towers, but a matter of life and 
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death, sometimes literally so. The obligation to defend one's positions against decidedly 
unfriendly critics obliged all actual and potential participants to thoroughly think and 
rethink their positions, and revise them where they had reason to fear that they might look 
less than totally coherent to an outsider. What is more, debates encouraged potential 
participants not only to rethink their own positions, but also to get to know the details of the 
positions of their opponents in the hope of finding weaknesses in them. The inevitable 
result was that ideas traveled quickly and easily from one group to the next, and were also 
studied by those who were not inclined to accept them.12 
 These considerations anchor the development of Indian philosophy into the firm 
ground of the socio-political reality of its time. Ideas did not follow their logical 
developments for some abstract logical reasons, but because the philosophers concerned 
were under pressure to improve their own positions and find weaknesses in those of others. 
They were under such pressure because they might be called upon to defend their points of 
view. Seen in this way, the development of Indian philosophy during the period under 
consideration was in no small measure due to a particular custom that had installed itself at 
the royal courts and perhaps elsewhere: the custom to organize debates between scholars 
representing altogether different currents of thought. 
 Once such a custom has become part of tradition, it may continue even without 
political pressure. That is to say, scholars may go on critically refining their own positions 
and continue to show an interest for positions with which they disagree even when there is 
no king around who may oblige them to participate in a debate. Indeed, debating traditions 
may persist even in times when the stakes are less high. This does not change the fact that 
few people, and this includes scholars, will be keen to have their most sacredly held beliefs 
questioned in public if they are not obliged to submit to such an ordeal. In the Indian 
situation, it appears, they were obliged to do so. 
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 The question therefore presents itself: Why did kings play this role? How did the 
custom of organizing debates establish itself in India? And which are the reasons that it 
maintained itself there for many centuries? 
 These are difficult questions which cannot be answered by merely studying the 
philosophical arguments presented in the texts. Quite on the contrary, an answer to these 
questions may help us understand why those arguments were presented to begin with. It is 
by no means self-evident that arguments are important, or indeed that they have to be 
considered at all. In India itself voices were heard against the “dry reasoning” which was 
going on in the philosophical schools. These voices became particularly strong when 
Buddhism declined as a force in society in the second half of the first millennium. It is 
certainly no coincidence that precisely at that time ritual M¥måµså and the Vedånta 
philosophy became important, both of which claimed to base themselves on the Veda 
which is essentially beyond discussion. 
 
Let us return to our period. I have suggested in another publication that the confrontation in 
debate with representatives of totally different points of view may have begun in the parts 
of north-western India ruled by Bactrian Greeks. This hypothesis accounts for an important 
number of known facts. It seems to me the most plausible explanation so far for the 
appearance of the debate tradition in India.13 This does not change the fact that the presence 
in India of two strong religious traditions one beside the other — viz. Buddhism and 
Brahmanism — could not but facilitate the confrontation of opinions. The circumstance that 
during this so-called “dark period” of Indian history many rulers appear to have been of 
foreign origin, and perhaps for this reason less exclusively linked to any one religious 
tradition, may have played a role as well. 
 Another factor that may have been of some importance is that this new tradition of 
critical debate could easily be assimilated to older practices that already existed in India. 
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Names like those of king Janaka are famous in late-Vedic literature, as are the debates 
which he is supposed to have organized in those early days. The debates recorded in the 
Upani∑ads are, to be sure, totally different from the ones that characterize classical Indian 
philosophy, and can by no means be looked upon as earlier manifestations of the same 
thing. (Bronkhorst 2002a) But it is at least conceivable that the very memory of kings like 
Janaka may have encouraged later kings with Brahmanical sympathies, too, to organize 
debates. The result would not be an Upani∑adic debate, but the organizing king would not 
know. Buddhism, too, preserved the memory of debates, usually between the Buddha and 
someone else. Being representatives of a missionary religion, Buddhist preachers could 
hardly avoid engaging in debates, following in this the example of their founder. 
 I do not think that these historical antecedents alone fully explain why debates 
subsequently became institutionalized. It seems yet likely that without such institutionalized 
debates systematic philosophy might have never arisen in India. 
 
 
Appendix: on the atomic nature of the Såµkhya tanmåtras 
 
Classical Såµkhya as we get to know it through its most important text, the Yuktid¥pikå, 
does not look upon the tanmåtras as being atomic. (Bronkhorst 1999c: 686 ff.) However, by 
rejecting this position it indicates that it is aware of it. 
 The idea of tanmåtras as being atomic is found in a variety of texts, both early and 
late. ShËjun Motegi (1986) has drawn attention to the Chinese translation of this term 
which is more often used to translate aˆu. (See further Imanishi 1961; 1968) 
 Very important evidence is provided by the Yoga Bhå∑ya.14 Here we read:15 "The 
tanmåtra is the cause of the element. The single part of the [latter] is an atom (paramåˆu) 
which is itself a collection of different component parts which do not exist separately, 
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consisting of a såmånya and a viße∑a. All tanmåtras are like this."16 This seems to mean that 
the tanmåtra is an atom, the single part of an element (bhËta). All, or some, elements may 
be composed of various tanmåtras; the Yoga Bhå∑ya is not however clear about this. It does 
not look upon the tanmåtra as a single quality, but as a collection of a såmånya and a viße∑a. 
The viße∑as are the normal five qualities, sound etc. The såmånyas are the five elements, 
but conceived of as generic qualities; they are corporeality (mËrti; which is earth), viscosity 
(sneha; which is water), heat (u∑ˆatå; which is fire), moving forward (praˆåmitå; which is 
wind), going everywhere (sarvatogati; which is ether).17 In introducing these generic 
qualities the Yoga Bhå∑ya deviates from other sources on Såµkhya.18 The fact that the 
Yoga Bhå∑ya, in spite of this difference, preserves the idea of the tanmåtra as an atom, is no 
doubt significant. 
 Another passage in the Yoga Bhå∑ya can be interpreted along the same lines:19 "The 
single modification as sound-tanmåtra of the constituents of nature (guˆa), which here take 
the form of something to be grasped (gråhya), is sound as object. A single modification of 
sound etc. when they are of the same kind as corporeality (mËrti) is the earth-atom, which 
is constituted of tanmåtras. A single modification of those [atoms] is such a thing as the 
earth, a cow, a tree, a mountain. Also in the case of the other elements, by taking up 
viscosity (sneha), heat (au∑ˆya), moving forward (praˆåmitva) or giving space 
(avakåßadåna) as generic quality, a single modification is to be produced." The crucial word 
tanmåtråvayava˙ must, in view of the context which speaks of ever more composite 
entities, be understood as a bahuvr¥hi compound: "the parts of which are tanmåtras".20 
 A passage from the Maitråyaˆ¥ya Upani∑ad (3.2; perhaps one of the first in which 
the term tanmåtra is used) easily lends itself to an interpretation in which it means atoms or 
something of the kind: “The explanation of (bhËtåtman) is this: the word bhËta designates 
the five tanmåtras. The word bhËta also designates the five principal elements. The 
aggregate of these is called body.”21 
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 A peculiar passage in Vyomaßiva's Vyomavat¥ — the earliest known commentary 
on the Padårthadharmasa∫graha which is better known by the name Praßastapådabhå∑ya — 
confirms the idea that the tanmåtras were at one point the ultimate constituents of the 
molecules of matter. This passage discusses and explains the Vaiße∑ika position according 
to which a body is made up either of earth, or of water, or of fire, or of wind, but not of any 
combination of these elements. The objection is raised that bodies might consist of various 
elements at the same time. In this connection the following passage occurs:22 
But if you accept the following: The constitution of a part, too, [can take place] with 
various elements. For example, a dvyaˆuka is constituted of an atom of earth and an 
atom of water, or again of an atom of water and an atom of fire, or of an atom of fire 
and an atom of wind. In the same way it [can be constituted] of wind and the 
tanmåtra of sound. These dvyaˆukas, once arisen, constitute, passing through [the 
stages] tryaˆuka etc., a body. 
This passage presents a position that is not accepted by Vyomaßiva, who points out that 
according to Vaiße∑ika doctrine the resulting dvyaˆukas and more complex entities cannot 
possess the qualities inhering in the constituent atoms. All this does not concern us at this 
moment. What does concern us is that the ßabdatanmåtra — the tanmåtra of sound, or the 
tanmåtra which is sound — is here presented as a constituent of a potential dvyaˆuka, and 
therefore as some kind of atom, besides the atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind. It takes 
the place of what should be the atom of ether; but obviously, ether being one and 
omnipresent, there can be no atom of ether in Vaiße∑ika. 
 This passage is enigmatic, because it is not quite clear who the opponent is. One 
may however guess that Vyomaßiva took this discussion, and therefore the position of the 
opponent, from an earlier work. Indeed, the same portion of the Vyomavat¥ ends with a 
long citation from a work which is identified as asya sËtrasya bhå∑yam "the Bhå∑ya on this 
sËtra". The sËtra concerned (bhËyastvåd rasavattvåc codakaµ rasajñåne prak®ti˙) cannot be 
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identified with certainty, but appears to have belonged to the Vaiße∑ika SËtra.23 The Bhå∑ya 
on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra was not, of course, the Praßastapådabhå∑ya, but the Ka†and¥, 
probably composed after Vasubandhu but before Dignåga; this we have seen. It is therefore 
possible, or even likely, that the discussion about dvyaˆukas constituted of wind and 
ßabdatanmåtra occurred already in this earlier text, which may, in its turn, have been 
acquainted with an earlier work of Såµkhya, in which tanmåtra was still known in the 
sense of "constituent of a molecule". It seems however clear that the position described by 
Vyomaßiva — and perhaps taken by him from the Ka†and¥ — represents some hybrid 
between Såµkhya and Vaiße∑ika: whereas the notion of tanmåtra appears to be Såµkhya, 
that of dvyaˆuka and tryaˆuka is decidedly Vaiße∑ika. 
 A very late testimony to the atomic nature of the tanmåtras is a remark by Någeßa, 
in his subcommentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.4.29. Någeßa explains that, according to 
some, atoms such as the ones that are the ßabdatanmåtras are the word.24 
 If the material presented in this appendix is a bit higgledy-piggledy, it does show 
that the notion of tanmåtra has been associated with atoms from an early date onward, and 
until recently. The circumstance in particular that the tanmåtra is atomic in the classical 
texts on Yoga justifies us to surmise that is was like that in pre-classical Såµkhya. 
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ayutasiddhåvayavabhedånugata˙ samËho dravyam indriyam "the sense-organ is the substance which is an 
aggregate whose parts do not exist separately, of a såmånya and a viße∑a"; here the singular number of 
såmånya and viße∑a is guaranteed by the dual ending of their compound. 
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18 The parallelism between the position of the Yoga Bhå∑ya and that of the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya — here 
as elsewhere — is striking; cf. Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 8 l. 21-22; p. 53 l. 9-10. Note also that the Yuktid¥pikå 
under SK 38 enumerates (in ßlokas) a great number of characteristics of the five elements, which includes the 
ones given in the Yoga Bhå∑ya, though sometimes different expressions are used (YD p. 225 l. 24 ff.) 
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20 Hattori (1968: 154 n. 5.31) concludes from this passage that “[t]he Såµkhyas hold that the five kinds of 
tanmåtras are composed of their respective atoms”. This interpretation may have to be revised. 
21 van Buitenen 1962: 102: asyopavyåkhyånam: pañca tanmåtråˆi bhËtaßabdenocyante/ atha 
pañcamahåbhËtåni bhËtaßabdenocyante/ atha te∑åµ yad samudayas tac char¥ram ity uktam/; tr. van Buitenen 
1962: 129. 
22 Vy. I p. 81 l. 13-21: athåvayavasyåpy anekabhËtair årambha˙/ tathåhi, pårthivåpyåbhyåµ paramåˆubhyåµ 
dvyaˆukam, punar åpyataijasåbhyåm, tathå taijasavåyav¥yåbhyåm årabdham iti/ evaµ 
våyußabdatanmåtråbhyåm/ etåni dvyaˆukåny utpannåni tryaˆukådiprakrameˆa ßar¥ram årabhanta ity 
abhyupagame ... 
23 Vy. I p. 82 l. 20 ff. Two slightly different sËtras with their Bhå∑yas are cited Vy. I p. 85 l. 17 ff. (bhËyastvåd 
rËpavattvåc ca rËpajñåne prak®ti˙ kåraˆaµ teja˙) and I p. 90 l. 4 ff. (bhËyastvåt sparßavattvåc ca sparßajñåne 
prak®tir våyu˙). 
24 Någeßa on Kaiya†a on P. 1.4.29 vt. 2: paramåˆËnåµ ßabdatanmåtrådirËpåˆaµ kaißcit ... ßabdatvam i∑yate. 
